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Abstract
The feedback negativity, a component of the event-related brain potential, is elicited by 
feedback stimuli indicating unfavorable outcomes. The feedback negativity has been 
regarded to reflect a process of performance monitoring and/or learning about recently 
executed actions, since it has been primarily investigated using experimental paradigms 
where outcomes seemed to be contingent upon the behavior of the participants. Recently 
several studies demonstrated that the feedback negativity  can be elicited as well by 
outcomes that are not contingent on preceding actions or choices. These findings led to the 
suggestion that the feedback negativity  might additionally  reflect the evaluation of 
expectations about environmental contingencies. The present study  attempted to test this 
suggestion by  evaluating the feedback negativity while participants‘ expectations about 
contingencies in the Ultimatum Game, a commonly-used bargaining task, were 
manipulated. Participants were confronted with proposers, displaying either a smile or an 
angry face, who provided differential fair offers. The displayed facial expressions were 
meant to affect expectations about succeeding offers. Larger feedback negativity 
amplitudes were elicited following unfavorable outcomes, more precisely after unfair and 
midfair offers, compared to fair offers. Furthermore a happy proposer offering an amount 
of money perceived as unfair elicited a more pronounced feedback negativity  amplitude 
compared to angry proposers offering the same amount of money. Thus, violated 
expectations about contingencies in the Ultimatum Game (happy  proposers providing 
unfair offers) led to more pronounced feedback negativity amplitudes. 
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Theoretical Part
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1. Homo Oeconomicus and Behavioral Economy
Standard economic models traditionally  base upon the homo oeconomicus concept. The 
homo oeconomicus is guided by his individual preferences, seeks to achieve his objectives 
with minimal costs, (Faber, Petersen, & Schiller, 2001) and behaves in an opportunistic, 
rational and calculating manner (Gray, 1987). He is always trying to maximize his own 
utility, based on his stable preferences. 
The notion that people alway try to obtain the highest  possible level of utility results from 
the assumption, that economic decision making follows careful deliberation, a balancing of 
costs and benefits of different options. The process of decision making takes place at a 
stage, where further deliberation, reflection and computation would not alter the choice 
(Camerer, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2005). It is assumed that  humans have the cognitive 
ability and time to weigh every choice against each other.
Economical research, grounded on the concept of homo oeconomicus, turns its focus on 
observable external behavior. Economic models are achieved by measuring input and 
output information and eliminating the assumption of intermediating feelings. Emotions 
and feelings, as not directly measurable, are regarded as useless intervening constructs. 
Assuming that the human brain, underlying behavior, and its functioning cannot be fully 
understood, it is sidelined as the ultimate „black box“.
For instance, the revealed preference theory, assuming that  humans behave as suggested by 
the homo oeconomicus concept, equates unobserved preferences with observed choices. To 
evade circularity it  is assumed that people behave consistently. If a person has once 
revealed that she prefers A to B, she should not choose B over A afterwards (Camerer et 
al., 2005). Related „as-if“  tools were later provided by extensions of the revealed 
preference theory, such as expected, subjective expected, and discounted utility. 
However various studies repeatedly revealed theoretically predicted behavior deviating 
from real human behavior (Camerer & Thaler, 1995). These anomalies and the emerging of 
cognitive psychology around 1960, perceiving the human brain as a metaphor for an 
information-processing device, enabled a new research of ignored topics like decision-
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making and problem-solving, guiding the way  to the development of behavioral economics 
(Camerer & Loewenstein, 2004).
1.1 Behavioral Economics
Behavioral economics approach is defined by integrating more realistic psychological 
concepts about the human nature and decision-making into economic research and thus, to 
increase the explanatory power of economics. 
According to Mullainathan and Thaler (2001) behavioral economic research consists of 
two components:
1. Identifying the ways in which behavior differs from the standard model.
2. Showing how this behavior matters in economic contexts.
Psychological ideas are formalized and translated into testable predictions, to broaden 
models of economic behavior. Instead of ignoring non-rational-behavior, behavioral 
economists perceive economic behavior as influenced by emotions and subconscious 
processes as demonstrated in concepts like bounded rationality, bounded willpower or 
bounded self-interest (Kenning & Plassmann, 2005). Bounded rationality applies to the 
limited cognitive abilities that narrows human problem solving. Bounded willpower refers 
to the fact that people sometimes make choices that are not in their long-run interest. 
Bounded self-interest implicates the circumstance that humans are often willing to give up 
their own interests to help others (Mullainathan & Thaler, 2001).
Integration of psychology led to several new models on decision making. The realization 
that conditions occur under which humans behave in an irrational way  as well as that 
conditions exist under which humans behave rationally resulted in the growing conviction 
that human decision making can be viewed as product of two underlying processes: a 
bounded rational process and an irrational process (Glimcher, Dorris, & Bayer, 2005). 
According to Glimcher (2005) irrational behavior is often attributed to limited neural 
architecture while rational behavior is seen as a product of a conscious faculty  exceeding 
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these limitations. Kahneman (2002) distinguishes in his well known dual-process model 
between reasoning and intuition. According to Kahneman one function of System 2 
(reasoning) is to monitor the quality of both mental operations and overt behavior. This 
monitor function allows many intuitive judgements to be expressed, including erroneous 
ones.   
 Kahnemans‘ dual-process model:
Fig.1:Dual process model (taken from Kahneman, 2002)
    
The assumption of underlying cognitive systems, guiding behavior and being responsible 
for observed deviations from standard economical models is postulated due to the 
observation and analysis of behavior, which in turn is used to explain behavior. Criticism 
from the traditional economics point of view relates to this circular reasoning as well as to 
the fact, that these theoretical constructs are neither observable, nor objectively measurable 
(Kenning & Plassmann, 2005). According to Kenning and Plassmann (2005) the answer to 
these problems would be the usage of new tools or methods, permitting a more objective 
way of investigating behavior. The requested methodical repertoire to investigate behavior 
in a more objective way is provided by neuroscience, since neuroscientific tools are used to 
directly analyze the brain operations underlying human behavior.   
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2. Neuroeconomics and Game-Theory
Neuroeconomics is the study of how the embodied 
brain interacts with its external environment to pro- 
duce economic behavior. Research in this field will 
allow social scientists to better understand individ- 
uals' decision making, and consequently to better 
predict economic behavior (McCabe, 2003). 
Neuroeconomics is defined as the application of neuroscientific methods to analyze and 
understand economically relevant behavior (Kenning & Plassmann, 2005). Its aim is to 
investigate and analyze brain processes related to economical behavior. Neureconomics 
provides the extension of economic research to brain processes, opening the „black box“, 
traditionally ignored in standard economic models.
See below a short description of the three most popular methods used in neuroeconomics 
(for a detailed description, see Schandry, 2006):
• Electroencephalography  (EEG): electrodes are attached to the head in order to measure 
electrical activity. This activity  is synchronized to behavioral responses or stimulus 
events.
• Positron-emission-topography (PET): detects the location and concentration of small 
amounts of radioactive substances to examine the metabolic activity in the brain relating 
to experimental manipulation.
• Functional magnetic resonance tomography (fMRI): measures the change in blood flow 
related to neural activity in the human brain.
• Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS): noninvasive method to excite or inhibit 
neurons in the brain, by induction of weak electric currents in the tissue through rapidly 
changing magnetic fields.
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The investigation of psychological and neuronal correlates of social decisions is becoming 
increasingly  popular as part of the neuroeconomic approach. Neuroeconomics aims at a 
fundamental comprehension of decision-making, regarding neural and cognitive 
constraints, as known from neuroscience and psychology, while mathematical decision 
models serve as a basis. Neuroscientific techniques are used to investigate the relative 
contributions of cognitive and emotional processes to social decision-making (Sanfey, 
Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003). Tasks used to investigate social decision-
making are commonly out of a branch of experimental economics, named Game Theory.
2.1 Game Theory
Game theory is a theory of decision making. Developed in the middle of the twentieth 
century from Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Nash (1950), the theory of games 
defines individual, rational decision-making in social situations of conflict (Güth, 1998). 
Social situations of conflict (the game) are characterized as two agents (players), who have 
partly countervailing objectives, may behave in an unrestricted way and are in opposition 
to each other. Game Theory demands to explain situations in which decision-makers must 
interact with one another (Sanfey, 2009). 
According to Camerer et al. (2005) the theory of games acts on the following assumptions:
1. Players have accurate beliefs about what others will do.
2. Players have no emotions or concern about how much others earn.
3. Players plan ahead,
4. and learn from experience.
Widespread criticism refers to these assumptions, since observed behavior deviates from 
the models‘ predictions (Camerer, 2003). Decision-makers seem to be less strategic and 
selfish then predicted. The Ultimatum Game, a common game theoretical application, 
illustrates the limitations of the classical game theoretic approach in a simple and effective 
way.
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2.2 Ultimatum Game
The Ultimatum Game is used to examine strategic bargaining behavior and to investigate 
responses to fairness. In this game one player, the proposer, has to split a sum of money  (in 
general $10) with another player (responder). The responder has the opportunity to reject 
or accept the offer provided by the proposer. If the responder accepts the offer, the sum 
gets split as proposed, otherwise neither of the two players receives anything.
The responder should accept the smallest offer, if the responder has no emotional reaction 
to the fact that the proposer is earning more than she is (as predicted by game theory). The 
proposer should offer the lowest possible amount, if the proposer has no emotional reaction 
to earning more and is able to anticipate correctly  the forthcoming actions of the responder 
(Camerer et al., 2005). In summary, the smallest sum should be offered as well as accepted.
Behavioral results are at odds with these predictions (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 
1982). The modal sum offered by proposers is a 50/50 split. Low offers (less than 20% of 
the total amount) get rejected by half of the responders. In connection with low offers 
responders seem to prefer gaining nothing. According to Pillutla and Murnighan (1996) 
low offers, perceived as unfair, cause angry reactions, leading to the rejection of low offer. 
These negative feelings seem to motivate people to actively refuse monetary reward and to 
penalize their opponent. A responder, rejecting an offer spends money to punish somebody 
who has behaved unfairly  (Camerer & Loewenstein, 2004). Anticipating the possibility of 
low offers getting rejected, proposers generally avoid low offers.
16
2.3 Ultimatum Game and Neuroeconomics
One of the most prominent neuroscientific findings about  the Ultimatum Game comes 
from Sanfey  et al. (2003). This fMRI study compares neural activity responding to unfair 
and fair offers. Unfair offers differentially activated three regions of the human brain:
• the anterior insula,
• the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC),
• and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).   
Fig.2: Activated brain regions in response to receiving an unfair (vs. fair) offer in the Ultimatum Game 
(adapted from Rilling et al.,2008)
   
Bilateral anterior insula activation is commonly associated with negative emotional states. 
This region seems to participate in the evaluation and representation of specific negative 
emotional states (Damasio, Grabowski, Bechara, Damasio, Ponto, Parvizi et al., 2000). 
According to Sanfey et al. (2003) participants with stronger anterior insula activation to 
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unfair offers rejected a higher proportion of these offers. This result might underpin the 
assumption of neural representations of emotional states guiding human behavior.
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex has generally been implicated in executive control and goal 
maintenance, thus, cognitive processes. Sanfey  et al. (2003) associate stronger activation of 
this region to unfair offers with the representation and active maintenance of the cognitive 
demands of the task, achieving the maximum amount of money. To resolve emotional 
tendencies to reject unfair offers might be a bigger cognitive challenge and would result in 
stronger activations of the dlPFC.
One function, amongst others, of the anterior cingulate cortex has been linked to the 
detection of cognitive conflict  (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 1999). 
According to Sanfey et al. (2003) activation of the ACC might reflect the conflict between 
emotional and cognitive motives in the Ultimatum Game.      
In summary, evidence that unfair offers engage neural structures involved in cognitive and 
emotional processing seems to be provided. In addition, magnitude of activation in 
structures included in emotional processing appear to explain variance in the subsequent 
decision.    
Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, & Fehr, (2006) demonstrated that low-frequency 
TMS of the right dlPFC led to an increased acceptance rate of unfair offers in the 
Ultimatum Game compared to a placebo stimulation. According to Knoch et al. these 
findings suggest that the right dlPFC may not be critical in controlling the impulse of 
rejecting unfair offers, but rather represents offers as fair or unfair. As a consequence 
subjects with impaired dlPFC accept all offers. 
Finally Polezzi, Daum, Spitzer, & Kiefer, (2008) conducted an EEG-study to further 
investigate the Ultimatum Game. Unfair offers (90/10 split) as well as midfair offers 
(70/30 split) elicited a particular component called the feedback negativity, which is 
sensitive to negative feedback, indicating erroneous responses or the loss of money 
(Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd and Coles, 2002).   
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identified in reaction time tasks (reviewed in Refs. [8,9]).
This response ERN peaks within 100 ms of an error
response and also appears to be generated by neural activity
in the ACC [10,11]. This resemblance led to the proposal
that the negativities following response errors (the response
ERN) and negative feedback (the feedback ERN) were
associated with the same neural and cognitive error-
detection process [1].
1. Reinforcement learning theory of the ERN
A recent theory has extended the hypothesis of Miltner
et al. [1] by proposing that both the response ERN and the
feedback ERN are produced by a dopamine system for
reinforcement learning [12]. Details regarding the neuro-
physiological motivation for this theory are reviewed
elsewhere [12,13]. Briefly, the theory is predicated on
previous research implicating the basal ganglia andmidbrain
dopamine system in reward prediction and reinforcement
learning. According to this previous research [14,15] (for
review, see Ref. [13]), the basal ganglia evaluate ongoing
events and predict whether the events will end in success or
failure. When the basal ganglia revise their predictions for
the better, they induce a phasic increase in the activity of
midbrain dopaminergic neurons, and when the basal ganglia
revise their predictions for the worse, they induce a phasic
decrease in the activity of midbrain dopaminergic neurons.
These phasic increases and decreases in dopamine activity
indicate that ongoing events are ‘better than expected’ and
‘worse than expected,’ respectively, and are used by the basal
ganglia to update its predictions, such that the system
gradually learns the earliest predictor of reward or punish-
ment. Furthermore, the dopamine signals are also conveyed
to the frontal cortex where they are used as reinforcement
learning signals, serving the adaptive modification of
behavior. The reinforcement learning theory of the ERN
extends this theoretical framework by proposing that the
impact of the dopamine signals on ACC modulates the
amplitude of the ERN, such that phasic decreases in
dopamine activity (indicating that ongoing events are
worse than expected) are associated with large ERNs, and
phasic increases in dopamine activity (indicating that
ongoing events are better than expected) are associated
with small ERNs [12,16]. According to this position, the
dopamine signals are used by the ACC to improve
performance on the task at hand.
Since Miltner et al.’s report in 1997, much progress has
been made in understanding the neural basis and functional
significance of the feedback ERN. Many of the empirical
studies that have led to this progress have been inspired by
the reinforcement learning theory of the ERN (hereafter
called the ‘RL-ERN theory’). Below, we will review the
current knowledge about the feedback ERN. Our review
will be organized around four core predictions of the
RL-ERN theory: (i) The feedback ERN reflects a good/bad
evaluation; (ii) feedback ERN amplitude depends on the
relation between actual vs. expected outcome; (iii) feedback
ERN amplitude varies inversely with response ERN
amplitude as a function of learning; (iv) the feedback
ERN is generated in ACC. We will discuss each of these
predictions in turn, and evaluate the existing literature in the
light of these predictions. Following this overview, we will
discuss outstanding questions regarding the feedback ERN,
including the possibility that the ERN reflects the emotional
impact of a negative expectation violation. We note that
aside from this emotion hypothesis, the RL-ERN theory is
currently the only theory that attempts to explain the
functional significance of the feedback ERN. For example,
the conflict monitoring theory, while providing a powerful
explanation of the response ERN and brain-activity
associated with high-conflict correct trials, does not in its
present form address the feedback ERN [9,17].
2. Four predictions of the reinforcement learning theory
2.1. The feedback ERN reflects a good–bad evaluation
The RL-ERN theory holds that the ERN reflects the
outcome of an evaluation of events along a good–bad
dimension, suggesting that the ERN should be sensitive to
any performance-related feedback information indicating
favorable or unfavorable outcomes. This notion is supported
by the finding that an apparent ERN is observed following
feedback indicating a loss [18,19] and following feedback
indicating an incorrect response [1,20].
Although the negative ERP components elicited by
losses and by feedback indicating an incorrect response
have a similar morphology, timing with respect to
Fig. 1. Typical example of event-related brain potentials associated with
negative and positive feedback (adapted from Ref. [25]). Negative is
plotted up by convention. Waveforms were recorded from electrode Cz.
Arrows indicate the peak of the feedback ERN and the P300 components in
the waveform associated with negative feedback. Note that although the
P300 reaches maximum amplitude over posterior parts of the scalp, the
component is also visible over frontal regions as seen here.
S. Nieuwenhuis et al. / Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 28 (2004) 441–448442
D. Polezzi et al. / Behavioural Brain Research 190 (2008) 218–223 221
Fig. 3. FRN and N350 reflect differences in offers proc ssing. In the upper part ERPs waves are shown, while in the lower part mean amplitude as well as error bars are
illustrated.
dent variables and acceptance rate of the corresponding offer as
dependent variable.
For the FRN, amplitudes associated with mid-value offers
expl ined 40.7% of variance in individual acceptance behaviour
(F(1,12) =7.55, p< .05), with higher FRN amplitudes being associ-
ated with lower acceptance rates. FRN amplitudes associated with
unfair and fair offers, on the other hand, were not significantly
related to subjects’ behaviour, explaining only 4.7% and3.3%of vari-
ance in individual decision making behaviour (F(1,12) = .55, p= .48;
F(1,12) = .38, p= .55, respectively).
N350 amplitudes associated with mid-value offers explained
54.0% of variance in acceptance rates (F(1,12) =12.92, p< .01), with
h gher N350 amplitudes being ssociated with lower acceptance
rates. N350 amplitudes associat d with fair offers were also signif-
icantly related to acceptance rates, explaining 39.7% of variance in
individual behaviour (F(1,12) =7.23 p< .05). N350 amplitudes asso-
ciated with unfair offers, on the other hand, were not significantly
related to subjects’ behaviour (13.3% of variance, F(1,12) =1.69,
p= .22).
3.9. Source analysis results
To investigate the neural sources of FRN and N350 dif-
ferences betw en t offers, thre contrasts (unfair vs. mid-
value; mid-value vs. fair; fair vs. unfair) entered source
analysis.
Voxels survived the significance level in the mid-value
vs. fair contrast, the areas in question being the left
superior temporal gyrus (Brodmann Area 22) (t(24)=5.84,
puncorrected < .001, [−52 −11 −6]1) and the left inferior pari-
etal lobule (t(24) =5.16, puncorrected < .001, [−38 −60 43])1,
both showing higher activation for the mid-value compared
to the fair offers. No other contrast yielded significant results
(Fig. 4).
1 The reported coordinates refer to the Montreal Neurological Institute system.
The corresponding coordinates in Talairach are [−51 −11 −5] and [−38 −56 42],
respectively.
3. Feedback-Negativity
Learning from feedback how to behave and how to guide future behavior is a fundamental 
cognitive skill. The ability  to differentiate between positive feedback and negative 
feedback forms the basic principle for such learning (Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Talsma, 
Cols, Holroyd, Kok, & Van der Molen, 2004). Measures of event-related brain potentials 
(ERPs), derived from EEG recordings display differential neural response to negative and 
positive feedback. Certain ERP components seem to be selectively sensitive to the 
perception of positive or negative feedback. 
Various studies have reported that feedback related to performance elicits a negative going 
brain potential, peaking about 250 ms following feedback presentation, and being maximal 
over medial frontal scalp locations. The ampl tude of this component, called the feedback-
negativity (FN) is more pronounced for feedback stimuli indicating negative outcomes, 
such as the loss of money or incorrect response, than for feedback stimuli associated with 
positive outcomes (Miltner, Braun, & Coles 1997; Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd 
& Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al.,2004). 
(A)                                                                                              (B)
              
Fig.3:(A)Typical example of event-related brain potentials associated with negative and positive feedback 
(adapted from Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002). Negative is plotted up by convention. Waveforms were recorded 
from electrode Cz. (B) FN reported by Polezzi et al. (2008) i  the Ultimatum Game (adopted from Polezzi et 
al. 2008)
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The characteristics of the FN resemble in various ways those of another negative ERP-
component: the error-related negativity, ERN, (Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin 
1993) or error negativity, NE, (Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoorman, & Blanke, 1990), 
following erroneous responses in simple choice tasks, peaking within 100 ms and 
appearing over medial frontal scalp locations (for reviews, see Falkenstein, Hoorman, 
Christ, & Hohnsbein, 2000; Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Its amplitude is correlated with 
subjective judgments of response accuracy  (Scheffers & Coles, 2000) and is increased 
when response accuracy is emphasized over speed (Falkenstein et al., 1990; Gehring et al., 
1993). Furthermore the amplitude of the ERN is reduced following incorrect responses to 
stimuli that  are presented relatively infrequently  (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Source 
localization analyses have detected the medial frontal cortex, in or near the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) as the most likely generator for both components, feedback-
negativity and error-related negativity (Miltner et al., 1997, Gehring and Willoughby, 
2002; Ruchsow, Grothe, Spitzer, & Kiefer, 2002).
3.1 Anterior Cingulate Cortex and Feedback-Negativity
The anterior cingulate cortex, a structure located on the medial surface of the frontal lobes, 
has diverse functions. The anterior cingulate cortex is subdivided into „cognitive“ and 
„affect“ regions (Bush, Whalen, Rosen, Jenike, McInerney, & Rauch, 1998; Vogt, Finch, & 
Olson, 1992).
Dorsal regions of the ACC, including cortex on the dorsal and ventral banks of the 
cingulate sulcus (BA 24b´-c´ and 32c´), represent the cognitive subdivision being crucial 
for error processing (Carter, Braver, Barch, Borvinick, Noll, & Cohen, 1998) and for 
mediating processes such as response inhibition (Bush et al., 1998). This cognitive 
subdivision is part of a distributed attentional network (Bush et al., 2000), maintaining 
reciprocal interconnections with lateral prefrontal cortex (BA 46/9), parietal cortex (BA 7), 
and premotor and supplementary motor areas (Devinsky, Morrell, & Vogt, 1995). These 
connections suggest that these ACC regions play a critical role in high level motor-control 
and action selection. Caudal-dorsal regions share further connections with other neural 
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systems involved in reward processing and decision making, such as the mesencephalic 
dopamine system (Crino, Morrison, & Hof, 1993) and orbitofrontal cortex (van Hoesen, 
Morecraft, & Vogt, 1993). The  ERN (Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994; Holroyd, Dien, & 
Coles, 1998) and the FN (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd et al., 2004; Miltner et 
al., 1997) seem to be generated in dorsal regions of the ACC, although the source of the 
FN is controversial (Nieuwenhuis, Slagter, von Geusau, Heslenfeld, & Holroyd, 2005). 
The rostral-ventral ACC (rostral areas 24a-c and 32, and ventral areas 25 and 33) 
corresponds to the affective subdivision, and is connected to the amygdala, periaqueductal 
gray, nucleus accumbens, hypothalamus, hippocampus, anterior insula and orbitofrontal 
cortex (Devinsky et al., 1995). This affective subdivision is concerned with processing and 
integration of emotional information (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Simpson, Drevets, 
Snyder, Gusnard, & Raichle, 2001). 
               
Fig.4: Cytoarchitectural subregions of anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) per Brodmann system 
(dACC subregions in red and rACC subregions 
in blue). (adapted from Bush et al. 2000)
Additional to source localization analyses, which identified the ACC as probable generator 
of the feedback negativity, neurophysiological evidence is consistent with this position. 
fMRI studies found enhanced activation related to error feedback (Ullsperger & Von 
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Cramon, 2003) and to unexpected decreases in rewards (Bush, Vogt, Holmes, Dale, Greve, 
Jenike et al., 2002; Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Nystrom, Mars, Coles et al., 2004) in a 
dorsal region of the ACC. Single-cell recording studies in primates reported increased 
activity of neurons in the ACC following negative outcomes, such as the absence of 
expected rewards (Niki & Watanabe, 1979; Ito, Stuphorn, Brown, & Schall, 2003). In 
addition, a study by Holroyd et  al. (2004) described a single area in caudal and dorsal ACC 
as being activated by both error responses and by error feedback. Finally  the orientation of 
pyramidal cells in the anterior cingulate sulcus, in contrast to the cortical layers in the 
nearby  cingulate gyrus and supplementary motor area (SMA), could generate a negative 
frontocentral negativity such as the feedback negativity (Holroyd & Coles, 2002).
Consistent with these findings that the caudal-dorsal ACC is involved in feedback and 
reward processing, as well as in high-level motor control and action selection, ACC has 
been implicated in various critical cognitive functions, such as response conflict 
monitoring (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 
2004), error detection (Miltner et al., 1997), evaluation of reward value (Gehring & 
Willoughby, 2002), and response selection or selection for action (Picard & Strick, 2001; 
Holroyd and Coles, 2002). 
According to Miltner et al. (1997) the FN reflects the operation of an error-processing 
system. They further proposed that FN and error-related negativity are functionally similar. 
Miltner et al. (1997) suggested that  these two components may reflect activation of a 
generic error detection system. FN and ERN are thought to reflect the outcome of a 
comparator process that detects errors as mismatches between the actual response and 
knowledge about the correct or intended response(Coles, Scheffers, & Holroyd, 2001; 
Falkenstein et  al., 1991, 2000; Gehring et al., 1993; Scheffers, Coles, Bernstein, Gehring, 
& Donchin, 1996; Scheffers & Coles, 2000).
Conflict monitoring theory, another theory  of anterior cingulate function, acts on the 
assumption that ACC regions detect response conflict. Response conflict is defined as the 
coactivation of mutually  incompatible responses (Yeung, Ralph, & Nieuwenhuis, 2007), 
detected by the ACC to signal the requirement for increased cognitive control to the lateral 
prefrontal cortex, when conflict is high (Botvinick et al., 1999; Carter et al.,1998). In 
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connection with errors conflict develops when continued stimulus processing after an error 
leads to activation of the correct response (Yeung et al.,2007). Activation of the correct 
response results in conflict with the incorrect  response just produced. From this point of 
view the ACC carries out a monitoring function and instigates intervention in other 
systems, to regulate behavior.
The conflict monitoring theory suggests that the error-related negativity is elicited by these 
particular conflicts, proposing that the higher the conflict, the larger the ERN (Botvinick et 
al., 2001). According to Holroyd and Coles, the weakness of the conflict  monitoring theory 
is due to the insufficient possibility to account for the FN, because the FN follows the 
response and cannot be explained as an outcome of conflict emerging in the response 
generation. 
Two related theories (Holroyd & Coles,2002; Gehring & Willoughby, 2002) have 
emphasized the reward signaling function of feedback and associate the FN with 
processing of the reward value and motivational significance of ongoing events, rather than 
relating the FN specifically to error monitoring.
3.2 Reinforcement learning theory
Holroyd and Coles (2002) extend Miltners hypothesis that negativities subsequent to 
response errors (ERN) and negative feedback (FN) were related to the same neural and 
cognitive error detecting process (1997), by suggesting that the ERN as well as the FN are 
produced by a dopamine system for reinforcement learning. This assumption is based on 
preceding research, which connected the basal ganglia and midbrain dopamine system with 
reinforcement learning and reward prediction.
According to this previous research (Barto, 1995; Montague, Dayan, & Sejnowski, 1996) 
the basal ganglia, a group of interconnected subcortical nuclei, compute the value and the 
change in value of ongoing events. In other words, the basal ganglia predict whether 
ongoing events will end in success or failure (Nieuwenhuis et  al., 2004). Whenever the 
basal ganglia determine that ongoing events are worse than expected, they induce phasic 
increase in the activity  of midbrain dopaminergic neurons. Conversely, if the basal ganglia 
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adjust their predictions for the better (ongoing events are better than expected), they induce 
phasic increases in dopaminergic activity. The basal ganglia use these phasic increases and 
decreases in dopamine activity  to update their predictions. Holroyd and Coles propose that 
these reward predictions can be based on internal information (erroneous responses) or 
external information (negative feedback). The dopamine signals are carried to several 
cortical brain regions, including a fraction of the ACC, serving as reinforcement learning 
signal to modify adaptive behavior. 
According to Holroyd and Coles (2002) the ACC is the recipient of these reinforcement 
learning signals. They suggest that the arrival of information about changes in reward 
prediction elicits the feedback negativity  in the ACC. Holroyd and Coles further propose 
that phasic decreases in dopamine activity (ongoing events are worse than expected) are 
connected with larger FNs and phasic increases in dopamine (ongoing events are better 
than expected) are connected with small FNs. Positive dopamine signals inhibit the apical 
dendrites of motor neurons in ACC, while negative dopamine signals disinhibit these 
apical dendrites, which is displayed at the scalp  in the form of the FN. Thus, the FN is 
elicited whenever the monitoring system detects that  the consequences of an action are 
worse than expected. The size of the prediction error is proportional to the amplitude of the 
FN. Consequentially the reinforcement learning theory suggests that  the FN is sensitive to 
deviance from the expected value of the reward (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004). According to 
this position, the ACC uses information, conveyed by the midbrain dopamine system, to 
learn about consequences of recent actions and to consequently improve future response 
selection. Thus, the dopamine signals are used to guide action selection mediated by 
cingulate motor areas via negative reinforcement of inappropriate behavior.
Gehring and Willoughby (2002) proposed a related theory that differs in the assessed role 
of the ACC. While Holroyd and Coles assume that ACC is the recipient of evaluative 
information, Gehring and Willoughby suggest that FN directly reflects the role of ACC in 
evaluating the motivational significance of ongoing events. From this point of view ACC is 
seen as the source of evaluative information, while the FN reflects this evaluation of 
whether ongoing events are bad or good. Thus, the FN is suggested to reflect a rapid 
assessment of the motivational impact of an event. This assessment contributes to the 
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evaluation of outcomes, which in turn is particularly  sensitive to losses (Gehring & 
Willoughby, 2002). Contrary to the reinforcement learning theory  these evaluated events 
are not bound to executed actions.
If the FN reflects an evaluation of ongoing events, regardless of whether those events are 
connected to recently  executed actions, the feedback negativity  should be related to 
feedback stimuli in general, whereas if it reflects the usage of this reward information to 
reinforce or punish recently executed responses, FN should only follow feedback to a 
specific performed action (Yeung, Holroyd, & Cohen, 2005)
However several studies (Yeung et al., 2005; Donkers, Nieuwenhuis, & van Boxel, 2005) 
demonstrated that the FN can be elicited by  outcomes that are not contingent upon recent 
actions. For instance Yeung et al. (2005) demonstrated that the FN occurs as well for 
passive tasks, with negative outcomes. These findings suggest that the FN reflects the 
reward signal alone and therefore, the evaluation of the motivational impact of outcomes. 
According to Yeung et al. (2005) another possible explanation for these findings in 
accordance with the assumption that the ACC plays a crucial role in action selection 
(Picard & Strick, 2001; Holroyd & Coles, 2002) would be that  the ACC does not only  use 
reward signals to reinforce representations of actions in terms of instrumental conditioning. 
In fact the ACC could use these representations of actions to learn about contingencies in 
the external environment (classical conditioning). Thus, Yeung and colleagues suggest that 
expectations about environmental contingencies could be regarded as covert responses, 
which in turn may be reinforced or punished. Therefore the reinforcement learning theory 
will need to be extended in future research to match these findings. 
4. Emotional faces
Humans use a wide range of information available to form expectations about other 
people‘s behavior. According to Scharlemann, Eckel, Kacelnik, & Wilson (2001) people 
predict the choices of others based on a vector of characteristics, which can be either 
inherent or intentional. Inherent  characteristics include gender, ethnicity, or age. These 
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characteristics signal a type. Additionally, individuals display social signals through 
language, body language and facial expressions. 
Particularly the human face appears to be an outstanding source of information and seems 
to play an important role in signaling social intentions. An extensive body of research is 
addressed to the investigation of human faces and what their expressions mean to 
observers. Darwin (1872/1998) suggested that  humans, as well as animals, have evolved 
patterns of signaling behavior, such as facial expressions. Ekman (1972;1983), who 
follows Darwin‘s account, acts on the assumption that if facial expressions are evolved, 
humans must share a common universal set. Since many facial expressions are involuntary, 
the question arises what faces reveal about the underlying emotional state of the expressor. 
Ekman (1972) argued that facial expressions signal corresponding emotional feelings. 
From this point of view facial expressions signal a specific emotional state of the 
expressor. This emotional content should be apparent to others, since the expressions are 
evolved and all humans share the same universal repertoire of expressions. Support for 
these assumptions comes from findings that  demonstrated that humans, regardless of the 
culture, identify several expressions of emotions in the same way (Ekman, 1983). 
According to Ekman (1983) six distinct emotions exist, including surprise, sadness, fear, 
disgust, anger and happiness.         
Fridlund (1994) challenges this „emotions view“ with the proposal of a „behavioral 
ecology“ view of faces. According to Fridlund facial expressions are social tools, evolved 
to convey intentions to a certain audience. Humans have an evolved awareness and ability 
to understand the social implications of faces. The impact of facial expressions varies in 
dependence of the social context and the facial displays occur due to social motivation. A 
smile for example, could convey solidarity, sympathy, approval or appeasement.     
The social functional analysis of emotions (Frijda, 1994; Keltner & Haidt, 1999) takes up  a 
related position. According to Keltner and Haidt (1999) especially in dyadic settings the 
communication of emotions conveys essential information to receivers about the sender’s 
beliefs and intentions. 
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In the end these theories share the assumption that people derive information from the 
observation of faces of others, no matter whether facial expressions signal a specific 
emotional state or serve as a social tool. 
4.1 Display of emotions in negotiations
As mentioned above people infer information and expectations about other peoples‘ 
behavior from displayed social signals, such as the facial expression. Based on this 
assumption research on negotiation behavior includes the investigation about how 
emotions and emotional display  affect interdependent decision making. In this context 
emotional states and the display of emotions are regarded as predictors of negotiated 
outcomes (Kopelman et al. 2006). Displayed emotions, whether positive or negative, may 
influence social interactions in various ways, since they could convey information which in 
turn may have behavioral consequences. Furthermore, displayed emotions have influence 
on strategic information processing (Forgas & George, 2001) and may serve as means of 
persuasion (Forgas, 2001). 
Generally induced positive emotions seem to increase cooperative behavior (Forgas, 1998), 
while negative affect may have an opposed impact, as demonstrated by Pillutla and 
Murnighan (1996) in the Ultimatum Game. People in negotiations seem to reciprocate their 
opponent’s emotions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). They get angry when confronted with an 
angry opponent and happy  when confronted with a happy  opponent (Friedman, Anderson, 
Brett, Olekalns, Goates, & Lisco, 2004).
In respect of displayed emotions, more precisely  the display of emotional faces, 
Kopelman , Rosette, & Thompson (2006) found that those players who displayed negative 
emotions in the Ultimatum Game prior to making an offer were more likely  to elicit 
rejections than those displaying either neutral or positive emotions. 
Thus, facial signals conveying social intentions seem to have considerable influence on 
peoples‘ emotions and how they evaluate and behave towards other people. 
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5. Recapitulation and Preview
As stated in the theoretical part, the FN is a component of the event-related brain potential 
that is elicited by feedback stimuli indicating unfavorable outcomes. The reinforcement 
learning theory considers the FN to reflect a negative reward prediction error signal that is 
elicited when the monitoring system detects that the consequences of recently  executed 
actions are worse than expected. Furthermore this error signal is used to negatively 
reinforce inappropriate behavior. Thus, the FN is regarded to reflect a process of 
performance monitoring and/or learning about recently executed actions. However Yeung 
et al. (2005) demonstrated that the FN also occurs for passively experienced negative 
outcomes. Since the FN was elicited by outcomes that were not contingent with recent 
actions, Yeung et al. suggested that expectations of rewards associated with particular 
stimulus characteristics, thus, expectations about environmental contingencies, could be 
regarded as covert responses, which in turn may be reinforced or punished.
To test this suggestion the present  study evaluated the FN while diverse facial expressions 
(happy, angry) of the proposers in the Ultimatum Game served as stimuli, which were 
meant to affect expectations of succeeding offers. The presumption that the diverse facial 
expressions lead to diverse expectations towards succeeding offers, is based on the 
postulation that  communicated emotions convey essential information to receivers about 
the sender’s beliefs, intentions and emotions (Keltner and Haidt, 1999). According to 
Fridlund (1994) the intention communicated via an angry face would be „readiness to 
attack“, while a happy  a face would convey solidarity, sympathy, approval or appeasement. 
It is assumed that these intentions will be perceived by  the participants, who took over the 
role of responders in the Ultimatum Game, and will result  in diverse expectations towards 
offers provided by proposers displaying either a happy facial expression or an angry facial 
expression. Prior to the particular offers pictures of the proposers, either displaying a smile 
or an angry face, were shown to the participants. In accordance with the finding of Polezzi 
et al. (2008) the FN should be elicited, whenever the responders are confronted with low 
offers, since people tend to expect fair offers (Chang & Sanfey, 2009). If the FN reflects a 
monitoring system that is not exclusively sensitive to performance but also to deviations 
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from expected environmental contingencies, the amplitude of the FN should be more 
pronounced at low offers provided by smiling proposers, than at  low offers provided by 
proposers with an angry face. Low offers made by proposers showing a smile prior to the 
offer should violate the proposers expectations to a larger extent  than low offers provided 
by angry proposers, which in turn should affect the amplitude of the FN.
Furthermore it is assumed, that the FN is generated in or near the anterior cingulate cortex.
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Empirical Part
31
32
1. Materials and Methods
1.1 Participants
Thirty right-handed subjects, fifteen women and fifteen men, between the ages of 18 and 
33 years, participated in the current experiment. The data of two male participants had to 
be excluded from further analysis due to inadequate behavior. The mean age of the 
remaining 28 subjects was 25,75 years (standard deviation [SD] = 3,11). Handedness was 
assessed by  the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). All Participants had 
normal or adequately corrected vision, were free of neurological diseases and had no 
psychiatric history. The study  was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of 
Helsinki and local guidelines and regulations of the University  of Vienna. Prior to 
participation, written informed consent was obtained from each participant.
Participants were told that they  would be paid based on their choices in the game, but in 
fact, performance was unrelated to subjects‘ remuneration. All subjects received " 10 for 
participating, subsequently to the experiment.  
1.2 Task and Procedure
The participants were comfortably seated at a viewing distance of roughly 70 cm in front 
of a 19-in. CRT computer monitor in a sound-attenuated room. Stimulus presentation and 
synchronization with the EEG data collection was controlled by E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology 
Software Tools, Inc.; http://www.pstnet.com). The participants assumed the role of the 
responder in the Ultimatum Game. Participants were told that they  would play with several 
proposers and that on each trial a proposer would make an offer of how to split " 10 
between them. Furthermore the participants were instructed to decide if they  would accept 
or reject the offer. 
Each trial started with a black fixation cross on a grey  background, having a duration of 
2000 ms. Subsequently  the participants were presented with a grayscale frontal 
photographic image of the face of the current proposer (8,7 cm # 9,5 cm; adopted from the 
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Averaged Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces; Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman,1998) for 
2000 ms. The selected photographs included 60 posers (30 male and 30 female) each 
depicting two facial expressions (angry, happy). In the following 1500 ms the participants 
were presented with the offer made by the proposer, indicated through two numbers, 
displayed one above the other, where the bottom number represented the amount of money 
the participant would receive. There were three different offer conditions: a fair condition 
(participant received " 5, proposer kept " 5), a midfair condition (participant received " 3, 
proposer kept " 7) and an unfair condition (participant received " 1, proposer kept " 9). 
After the presentation of the particular offer, participants had to accept or reject the offer 
by keypress. Two boxes, one left of the center, the other one right  of the center were 
displayed beneath the offer. One of the two boxes included the word „accept“, the other 
one the word „reject“. The participants used the right index finger on the „1“ key of the 
numeric keypad to choose the box on the left side of the screen and the middle finger on 
the „2“ key of the numeric keypad to choose the box on the right side. The assignment of 
the two response options („accept“ and „reject“) towards the two boxes varied randomly 
throughout the task, in order to keep attention high. The stimuli remained on until the 
participants‘ decision and keypress.   
+
2000 ms 2000 ms 1500 ms until keypress
7
3
7
3
accept reject
Baseline Emotional Face Proposal Decision
Fig 5: Example trial: trial sequence for a midfair offer provided by a happy proposer.
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The task consisted of 360 trials, resulting from the combination of each of the 120 
emotional face stimuli (60 happy, 60 angry) with each offer condition (fair, midfair, 
unfair). 
Hence there were six experimental conditions that guided the data analysis:
1. happy proposer - fair offer
2. happy proposer - midfair offer
3. happy proposer - unfair offer
4. angry proposer - fair offer
5. angry proposer - midfair offer
6. angry proposer - unfair offer
All of the 360 trials were presented fully randomized within six blocks of 60 trials each. At 
the end of each block during self-controlled rest breaks, participants received visual 
feedback indicating the cumulative amount of money earned. Each block was initiated by 
the participants at their own pace. The entire task lasted approximately 55 minutes.   
2. Electroencephalographic recording
EEG recordings were taken from 61 Ag/AgCl electrodes equidistantly  embedded in an 
elastic electrode cap (EASYCAP GmbH; http://www.easycap.de, model M10). A 
noncephalic sternovertebral reference (Stephenson and Gibbs, 1951), consisting of two 
electrodes, one placed at the 7th cervical vertebra and the other at the right sternoclavicular 
junction, was used for all EEG channels. The electro-oculogram (EOG) was recorded from 
electrodes placed above and below the left eye, and from electrodes placed on the outer 
canthi of each eye with a bipolar setting to allow off-line eye movement correction. The 
ground electrode was placed on the forehead. To ascertain stable and homogenous 
electrode impedances below 2 k$ the skin was scratched using a sterile single-use needle 
to slightly remove dead skin cells (Picton & Hillyard, 1972) at each electrode site prior to 
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EEG recording. Degassed electrode gel (Electro-Gel, Electrode-Cap International, Inc., 
Eaton/OH, USA) was filled into each electrode. Impedances were measured for each 
electrode by a manual impedance meter and kept below 2 k$. Individual 3D coordinates of 
17 pre-defined electrode locations, referenced to nasion, inion, and the two preauricular 
electrodes, were measured for all subjects with a photogrammetric head digitizer (3D-
PHD; Bauer, Lamm, Holzreiter, Holländer, Leodolter, & Leodolter, 2000). A standard head 
model was fit into these 17 pre-defined electrode positions and the missing electrodes were 
interpolated based on the eqidistant electrode montage.
All signals were recorded within a frequency range of 0.1 to 125 Hz and sampled at 250 
Hz for digital storage. 
3. Data analysis
3.1 Behavioral Data
Friedmans ANOVA was performed with type of OFFER (fair, midfair, unfair) and FACIAL 
EXPRESSION (happy, angry) as independent variables and acceptance rates as dependent 
variable. Furthermore pairwise comparisons were accomplished using Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests. For each comparison Bonferroni corrections were used. 
A 3 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA was carried out with type of OFFER (fair, midfair, 
unfair) and FACIAL EXPRESSION (happy, angry) as independent variables and reaction 
times (RTs, the  time period between offer onset and keypress) as dependent variable.
3.2 EEG Data
Artefacts due to eye movements were removed by successive subtraction of the weighted 
horizontal and vertical EOGs from each EEG channel trial by trial. Weights were 
calculated as the ratio of the covariance between each EEG channel and the EOG, and the 
variance within the EOG channels. These parameters were derived from two pre- 
experimental calibration trials where subjects performed guided vertical and horizontal eye 
movements (Bauer & Lauber, 1979). Blink coefficients were calculated using a template 
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matching procedure and subtracted from each EEG channel trial by  trial (see Lamm, 
Fischmeister, & Bauer, 2005, for a detailed description). 
Off-line analysis was performed using EEGLAB 6.03b (Delorme & Makeig, 2004), 
implemented in Matlab 7.5.0 (The MathWorks). EEG data were low-pass filtered with a 
cut-off frequency  of 30 Hz (roll-off 6 dB per octave) and epoched for each trial, starting 
200 ms before feedback onset and lasting for 1200 ms. The 200 ms interval preceding 
stimulus onset served as baseline. A semi-automatic artefact removal procedure was 
applied to the data of all subjects. Artefact-affected trials meeting the following criteria 
were labelled and finally rejected after visual inspection: voltage values exceeding 
+/-75%V in any  channel or a voltage drift of more than 75 %V. Furthermore trials 
containing muscular or movement artefacts were rejected based on visual inspection. 
Seven subjects of the original sample were excluded from further analysis due to enormous 
artefacts (21 subjects, 12 women and 9 men, remained, with a mean age of 25,71 years 
(standard deviation [SD] = 2,95).)  
3.3 ERP Data Analysis
Signal averaging was carried out separately per subject and per condition and grand 
averages of the six conditions were calculated. Data were grouped into 6 conditions 
including the factors facial expression and proposal: (i) happy  proposer - fair offer (happy-
fair), (ii) happy proposer - midfair offer (happy-midfair), (iii) happy  proposer - unfair offer 
(happy-unfair), (iv) angry proposer - fair offer (angry-fair), (v) angry proposer - midfair 
offer (angry-midfair), (vi) angry proposer - unfair offer (angry-unfair). To quantify the FN 
peak to peak voltage differences between the first negative peak 200-300 milliseconds after 
the onset of the Ultimatum Game offer and the average voltage value of the immediately 
preceding and following positive peak were assessed at electrode Fz (electrode Fz was 
chosen based on visual inspection of the grand mean and consistent to relevant literature 
on the FN; see for example Gehring and Willoughby, 2002). This method was employed 
according to Polezzi et al. 2008. The resultant FN data were analyzed using a 2 x 3 
repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) with FACIAL EXPRESSION (happy, 
37
angry) and OFFER (fair, midfair, unfair) as repeated-measures factors. The significance 
threshold was set at P & 0.05, two-tailed. P-values were corrected by  the Greenhouse-
Geisser adjustment where appropriate. Furthermore, planned contrasts were accomplished. 
Additionally, mean amplitude measures were calculated within a window of 200-300 ms 
following the presentation of the proposal and subjected to a repeated measures ANOVA 
with the factors LOCATION (electrode sites Fz, FCz, Cz and Pz), FACIAL EXPRESSION 
(happy, angry) and OFFER (fair, midfair, unfair). 
3.4 Source analysis
Source localization and analysis was carried out using standardized low-resolution brain 
electromagnetic tomography  (sLORETA; Pascual-Marqui, 2002). sLORETA is an inverse 
solution technique that estimates the distribution of the electrical neuronal activity  in three-
dimensional space by  assuming that neighboring neurons are simultaneously and 
synchronously activated, followed by an appropriate standardization of the current  density, 
producing images of electric neuronal activity without localization bias (Greenblatt, 
Ossadtchi, & Pflieger, 2005; Pascual-Marqui, 2002). sLORETA does not require any 
assumptions about the number, localization, configuration, or extent of neuronal sources. 
Mean amplitudes between 60 ms and 460 ms subsequent to the feedback onset using a step 
size of 20 ms were transformed. Individual electrode coordinates acquired via PHD were 
cross-registered to the standard Talairach atlas (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) resulting in 
three-dimensional distributions of cortical activation for each subject and each condition. 
The sLORETA solution space is restricted to cortical gray matter and hippocampus, 
defined via the MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute) reference brain and subdivided into 
6239 voxel, with a spatial resolution of 5 x 5 x 5 mm'. Subsequently MNI space is 
transformed to Talairach space. sLORETA computes the electric activity  at each voxel as 
the squared standardized magnitude of the estimated current density. A regularization 
parameter of zero was used for the transformation to achieve the smoothest of all possible 
solutions. Overall signal-to-noise-ratio was set at a ratio of 100 within the transformation 
process. The voxel-based sLORETA-images were compared between the conditions using 
the sLORETA-built-in voxelwise randomization tests (5000 permutations) based on 
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statistical non-parametric mapping (SnPM) (for details see: Holmes, Blair, Watson & Ford, 
1996).
4. Results
4.1 Behavioral Results
4.2 Acceptance rates
Acceptance rates differed significantly (see Fig. 6) among conditions (!2(5)=68, 64, Asymp. 
P = 0,000). Wilcoxon tests were used to follow up  this finding. A Bonferroni correction 
was applied and so all effects are reported at a 0,003 level of significance. Subjects 
accepted fair offers from happy proposers significantly more often (96.6%) than midfair 
offers (59.2%), (T = 1.5, Z = - 3.765, Exact. P = 0.000) and unfair offers (19.2%), (T = 1, Z 
= - 3.987, Exact. P = 0.000) from happy proposers. Furthermore midfair offers yielded 
higher acceptance rates than unfair offers ( T = 5.5, Z = - 3.603, Exact. P = 0.000) in the 
happy proposer condition.
Similarly, subjects accepted fair offers (90.7%) significantly more often than midfair offers 
(37.3%), (T = 3, Z = - 3.911, Exact. P = 0.000) and unfair offers (14.3%), (T = 1, Z = - 
3.992, Exavt. P = 0.000) from angry proposers. Midfair compared to unfair offers 
approached significance (T = 18, Z = - 2.773, Exact. P = 0.004).
Finally the facial expression of the proposer significantly affected the acceptance rates of 
midfair offers (see Fig. 7). Midfair offers provided by happy  proposers were significantly 
less often rejected than midfair offers provided by angry proposers (T = 16, Z = - 3.181, 
Asymp. P = 0.001). In contrast, unfair and fair offers were rejected similarly often for 
happy and angry proposers.
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Acceptance Rates
Fig.6: Acceptance rates for the three types of offers displayed
in absolute values (maximum = 60, as each of the six conditions con-
tained 60 trials) and error bars (CI = 95%).
                                                                                                           Acceptance Frequency    
                                                                                                        
Fig.7: Acceptance rates for the different typ s of offers and facial expressions 
 displayed in absolute values and error bars (CI = 95%).
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4.3 Reaction times
Following the procedure suggested Knutson, Rick, Wimmer, Prelec, & Loewenstein (2007) 
RTs were transformed using a logarithmic function. As illustrated in Fig. 8, RTs differed 
significantly between types of offers (F(2, 40) = 6.1, P = 0.004). Planned contrasts revealed 
that decisions in the HAPPY condition about midfair offers (1118 ms) took significantly 
longer compared to fair offers (931 ms) (Fig.9), (midfair vs. fair: F(1, 20) = 12.48 P = 
0.002). No other contrast reached significance. The repeated measures ANOVA of the RTs 
showed no main effect for FACIAL EXPRESSION (F(1, 20) = 0.61, P = 0.44), indicating 
that the facial expression of the proposer had no impact on the RTs (see Fig. 7).
Reaction Times
Fig.8: LN RTs for the three different types of offers
          and error bars (CI = 95%).
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Fig.9: LN RTs for the different types of offers and facial expressions
          and error bars (CI = 95%).
4.4 ERP DATA
4.4.1 Mean Amplitude Measures
Mean amplitude measures were calculated within a time window of  200-300 ms following 
the presentation (see Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Holroyd, Schurger, & Cohen, 2004) of the offer 
and submitted to a 4 x 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA with the factors LOCATION 
(electrode sites Fz, FCz, Cz and Pz), FACIAL EXPRESSION (happy, angry) and OFFER 
(fair, midfair, unfair). There were no significant main effects. The interaction effect 
between the two factors LOCATION and  OFFER reached the statistical threshold (F(2.39, 
47.85) = 3.28, P = 0.038). Planned contrasts revealed significant differences when 
comparing electrodes FCz and Pz for fair offers compared with unfair offers (F(1,  20) = 
7.985, P = 0.01). Furthermore significant differences were revealed when comparing 
electrodes Cz and Pz for fair offers compared with unfair offers (F(1, 20) = 7.987, P = 
0.01), indicating larger differences in the FN amplitude between fair and unfair offers at 
electrode positions FCz and Cz, than at  electrode Pz. No other interactions were 
significant.
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Due to differences in FN latencies at electrode FCz (significant main effect for FACIAL 
EXPRESSION (F(1,20) = 4.92, P = 0.038)), and at electrode Fz (significant main effect for 
OFFER (F(2,42) = 3.39, P = 0.043)) and the risk of other components contaminating the 
FN (overlap with the P300, while differences in absolute reward magnitude affect the 
amplitude of the P300; see Sutton, Tueting, Hammer, & Hakerem, 1978) the results of the 
mean amplitude measures calculation are reported but will not enter the discussion.
4.4.2 FN – Amplitude / Peak-to-Peak
Grand-average waveforms for all conditions, for the HAPPY condition, for the ANGRY 
condition and for unfair offers in both facial expression conditions at electrode site Fz are 
displayed in Figures 12 and 13.
Scalp  topographies of the voltage differences for the FN peak latency (235 ms) between 
unfair and fair offers in the HAPPY condition, in the ANGRY condition and differences in 
the unfair offer condition between FACIAL EXPRESSION conditions are displayed in 
Figure 14. 
FN data were analyzed using a repeated-measures ANOVA with FACIAL EXPRESSION 
(happy, angry) and OFFER (fair, midfair, unfair) as repeated-measures factors.
As illustrated in Fig. 10, FN amplitudes differed significantly between the different types 
of offers (F(2, 19) = 6.60, P = 0.007). Planned contrasts revealed that the FN was 
significantly smaller for fair compared to midfair offers (midfair vs. fair: F(1, 20) = 7.36, P 
= 0.013). The difference between fair and unfair offers reached significance (fair vs. unfair: 
F(1, 20) = 12.11, P = 0.002), indicating a more pronounced FN-amplitude for unfair offers. 
Contrasts for unfair and midfair offers did not show significant amplitude differences 
(midfair vs. unfair: F(1, 20) = 0.633, P = 0.43). Moreover, FN amplitudes differed 
significantly between the two types of facial expressions, (F(1, 20) = 7.79, P = 0.011), 
indicating more pronounced FN amplitudes in the happy proposer condition. Furthermore 
there was a significant interaction between the two factors OFFER and FACIAL 
EXPRESSION (F(2, 19) = 4.255, P = 0.03). This indicates that the facial expression of the 
proposer had different effects on the amplitude oft the FN, depending on which type of 
offer was made. Contrasts revealed that facial expressions differentially influenced the FN 
amplitude only  for fair vs. unfair offers (F(1, 20) = 8.89, P = 0.007). This effect shows that 
happy facial expression (compared to angry facial expression) elicited a more pronounced 
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FN amplitude for unfair offers than it did for fair offers (see Fig. 11). The remaining 
contrasts revealed no significant interactions.
                        
Fig. 10: mean peak-to-peak amplitudes of the FN for the three offer conditions.        
                                               
Fig. 11: mean peak-to-peak amplitudes of the FN for all six conditions.
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Fig. 12: Grand-average waveforms at electrode site Fz for the six different conditions (upper middle panel), 
and separately for the angry proposer conditions (lower left panel), for the happy proposer conditions (lower 
right panel).
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Fig. 13: Grand-average waveforms at electrode site Fz for unfair offers in 
              both facial expression conditions.
                                                                                                                                                          uV
Fig. 14: Scalp topographies of the voltage differences for the FN peak latency (235 ms) between unfair and 
fair offers in the HAPPY condition (left panel), in the ANGRY condition (middle panel) and differences in 
the unfair offer condition between FACIAL EXPRESSION conditions (right panel).
4.5 Source analysis 
 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics of sLORETA brain activity patterns
The grand averages of the conditions HAPPY-FAIR, HAPPY-MIDFAIR, HAPPY-UNFAIR, 
ANGRY-FAIR, ANGRY-MIDFAIR and ANGRY-UNFAIR showed similar activity  patterns at 
the FN latency (220-240 ms) in the parietal lobe, including the superior parietal lobule 
(BA7) and precuneus (BA7) (see Table 1). Figure 15 illustrates activity patterns at FN 
latency in the HAPPY-UNFAIR condition.
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Condition L a t e n c y -
Range
Anatomical region (BA) MNI Coordinates
HAPPY-FAIR 220-240 ms Superior Parietal Lobule (7)
Precuneus (7)
(X)25, (Y)-70, (Z)50
(X)20, (Y)-70, (Z)50
HAPPY-MIDFAIR 220-240 ms Superior Parietal Lobule (7)
Precuneus (7)
(X)25, (Y)-70, (Z)55
(X)30, (Y)-65, (Z)50
HAPPY-UNFAIR 220-240 ms Superior Parietal Lobule (7)
Precuneus (7)
(X)25, (Y)-70, (Z)50
(X)20, (Y)-75, (Z)50
ANGRY-FAIR 220-240 ms Superior Parietal Lobule (7)
Precuneus (7)
(X)30, (Y)-70, (Z)50
(X)25, (Y)-75, (Z)50
ANGRY-MIDFAIR 220-240 ms Superior Parietal Lobule (7)
Precuneus (7)
(X)25, (Y)-70, (Z)55
(X)25, (Y)-75, (Z)50
ANGRY-UNFAIR 220-240 ms Superior Parietal Lobule (7)
Precuneus (7)
(X)25, (Y)-70, (Z)50
(X)20, (Y)-75, (Z)50
Table 1: Localization of FN estimated activation maxima with sLORETA grand averages .
Fig.15: sLORETA images of grand averages at FN latency showing standardized estimated maxima for 
happy-unfair. Coordinates, anatomical structures are presented. Estimated cortical activation is shown from 
three perspectives (axial, sagittal,  and coronal view), displayed with a scale exponent of 5.75. Activation 
maxima are coded in yellow and red. 
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4.5.1 sLORETA within-subject comparisons 
SnPM was performed to address activation differences between each of the offer 
conditions and to compare similar offer conditions between the two facial expression 
conditions (comparisons of fair and midfair offers, fair and unfair offers, and midfair and 
unfair offers. Furthermore, happy-fair was compared with angry-fair, happy-midfair with 
angry-midfair and finally happy-unfair with angry-unfair). Cortical activation did not 
differ at the FN latency (220-240 ms) in any of the comparisons.
5. Discussion
Yeung et al. (2005) demonstrated that the FN, an ERP component related to the processing 
of unfavorable outcomes, can also be elicited by outcomes that are not contingent upon 
recent actions, such as by  negative outcomes in passive tasks.  This finding has been taken 
to suggest that the FN might not exclusively reflect the evaluation of recently  executed 
actions as suggested by the reinforcement learning theory (Holroyd and Coles, 2002), but 
might reflect as well the evaluation of expectations about environmental contingencies. 
From this point of view environmental contingencies are considered to be covert responses 
which in turn may be punished or reinforced to improve the predictive validity of these 
expectations. The present study attempted to test this suggestion by evaluating the 
feedback negativity while expectations about contingencies in the Ultimatum Game were 
manipulated. Participants were confronted with proposers, displaying a smile or an angry 
face. These facial expressions were meant to affect expectations about succeeding offers. 
It was predicted that low offers in general would elicit  larger FN amplitudes than fair 
offers. In addition, the we expected that the amplitude of the FN should be more 
pronounced for low offers provided by smiling proposers, than for low offers provided by 
proposers with an angry face.
The principal findings of the present research may be summarized as follows. First, on a 
behavioral level, the results were very similar to those found in other Ultimatum Game 
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experiments (Polezzi et al., 2008; Sanfey et al., 2003). Almost all fair offers (proposed split 
of 5/5) were accepted. Acceptance rates decreased as the offers became less fair. About half 
of the 7/3 offers (59.2 % in condition HAPPY and 37.3 % in condition ANGRY) and still 
less 9/1 offers (19.2 % in condition HAPPY and 14.3 % in condition ANGRY) were 
accepted. The acceptance of midfair offers was significantly  influenced by  the facial 
expression of the proposers. Midfair offers provided by angry proposers were less often 
accepted than midfair offers provided by happy proposers. This result stays in line with the 
finding of Kopelman et al. (2001) that proposers who displayed negative emotion in the 
Ultimatum Game were more likely to elicit rejections than those displaying either neutral 
or positive emotions and furthermore leads to the conclusion that the manipulation of the 
facial expression had relevant effects on a behavioral level. Reaction times highly 
resembled those reported by Polezzi and colleagues (2008), even though the button 
functions changed in the present study, whereas in the study conducted by Polezzi et al. 
(2008) participants had to press the same keys to accept or reject an offer throughout the 
whole experiment. Decisions about midfair offers took longer compared to fair offers.   
On the electrophysiological level, larger FN amplitudes were elicited following 
unfavorable outcomes, more precisely after unfair and midfair offers, compared to FN 
amplitudes following fair offers. Differences between the FN amplitudes following fair and 
unfair offers were larger for the happy facial expression condition. Thus, happy proposers 
offering an amount of money perceived as unfair elicited a more pronounced FN amplitude 
compared to angry proposers offering the same amount of money.
The former result replicates the finding of Polezzi et al. (2008) that unfair and midfair 
offers in the Ultimatum Game elicit a larger FN than fair offers. As in this study  no 
differences were detected between unfair and midfair offers. Furthermore the morphology 
of the FN found in the present  study resembles the one described by Polezzi et al. (see Fig.
3, Fig.9). 
This result is consistent with previous findings of large FNs being associated with 
unfavorable outcomes, e. g. losses in gambling tasks (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; 
Hajcak et  al., 2006) or negative performance feedback in a time estimation task (Miltner et 
al., 1997). Furthermore the finding that larger FN amplitudes were elicited following unfair 
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and midfair offers than following fair offers matches the assumption of the reinforcement 
learning theory that the FN reflects an evaluation of ongoing events along an abstract 
good-bad dimension (Nieuwenhuis et al. 2004). Thus, the detected FN amplitudes in the 
present study seem to represent a rapid distinction between offers perceived as fair and the 
other offer conditions (midfair offers, unfair offers). Assuming that responders in the 
Ultimatum Game expect a fair offer  (Chang  & Sanfey, 2009) and that deviations from the 
50-50 split equal a violation of these expectations, another basic assumption of the 
reinforcement learning theory, namely  that the FN amplitude depends on the relation 
between actual versus expected outcome (Nieuwenhuis et al. 2004), applies to the recent 
finding.
More immediate relevance regarding the latter assumption implies the result that happy 
proposers offering an amount of money perceived as unfair elicited a more pronounced FN 
amplitude compared to angry proposers offering the same amount. Following Fridlunds 
„behavioral ecology“ view of faces (1994), the social signals conveyed by a happy  face 
should lead people to expect fair rather than unfair offers, since a happy  face 
communicates intentions as solidarity, sympathy, approval or appeasement. In contrast 
people should not be astonished getting unfair offers from angry  looking proposers, as they 
signal `readiness to attack´. Whenever the actual offer deviated (in a negative direction) 
from expected offers, a more pronounced FN was elicited. Thus, the different FN 
amplitudes in the facial expression conditions can be attributed to diverse expectations.
Due to the fact that the reinforcement learning theory relates the FN to the evaluation of 
recently  executed actions, the present results contrast at this point with the original 
speculation of Holroyd and Coles (2002), since prospected outcomes were not contingent 
upon recent actions. The finding that  the FN can also be elicited by outcomes that are not 
contingent on recent actions is not new, since several studies (Yeung et al., 2005; Donkers 
et al. 2005) reported FNs in tasks where no action or response was required from the 
participants. The present study attempted to test the suggestion by Yeung et al. (2005), who 
speculated that the FN might additionally  reflect the evaluation of expectations about 
environmental contingencies (precisely, expectations of rewards associated with particular 
stimulus characteristics). The present findings support this suggestion, since the 
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combination of a happy proposer with an unfair offer presumably led to violations in 
expectancies, and therefore, to a larger FN. Additionally presumed violations of general 
expectations and fairness considerations were reflected in the FN‘s amplitude, with larger 
FN amplitudes following unfair and midfair offers in general. 
Furthermore source analyses of the current data did not yield any  significant activations. 
The absence of significant results could be related to the differences in FN latencies and 
the possibility of other components contaminating the FN amplitude. Thus, results should 
be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless it should be noted that it is generally assumed that 
the ACC is the most  likely  generator of the FN (e.g. Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; 
Holroyd and Coles, 2002), with larger FN amplitudes being associated with stronger ACC 
activity. Sanfey  and colleagues (2003) reported heightened ACC activity  for unfair offers 
in the Ultimatum Game which would be in accordance with the findings of the present 
study that unfair offers led to pronounced FN amplitudes. Furthermore, scalp  topographies 
of the voltage differences for the FN peak latency showed a frontocentral distribution (see 
Figure 10) 
Activation maxima with sLORETA grand averages for the six conditions were found in 
parietal regions (Brodmann area 7, precisely  superior parietal lobe and precuneus). The 
superior parietal lobe was recently demonstrated to be affected by  the presence of response 
conflict (Wendelken, Ditterich, Bunge, & Carte, 2009). Response conflict  in the Ultimatum 
Game may be associated with the rejection of unfair offers, namely  the rejection of an 
economically  advantageous situation because of a subjective perception of unfairness. 
Higher activation in the precuneus in the Ultimatum Game, was reported by Rilling, 
Sanfey, Aronson,  Nystrom, & Cohen (2004), when subjects were interacting with 
presumed human partners compared to computer partners. Rilling and colleagues 
suggested the precuneus to be one of the areas, which are recruited when participants are 
inferring the intentions of social partners. Thus, reported activation maxima seem to be 
consistent with relevant literature, but have to be interpreted with caution due to the 
absence of significant differences between the conditions. 
To the authors‘ knowledge, the current study is the first to explicitly address the relation of 
the FN and environmental contingencies. The studies conducted by  Yeung et al. (2005) and 
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Donkers et. al. (2005) concentrated on the relation of the FN and the impact of outcomes 
that were not contingent  upon recent actions without manipulating or controlling 
expectations about environmental contingencies. Therefore the present study can be seen 
as a first step to shed light  on the FN recognized as learning signal in a context including 
environmental expectancies.
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Appendix
!. Instruction in German
Die Spielregeln
In diesem Spiel gibt es zwei Spieler (Anbieter, Spieler 1) und einen Geldbetrag von 10 ". 
Der Anbieter entscheidet wie er diesen Geldbetrag aufteilen möchte. Du als Spieler 1 
kannst entscheiden ob du dieses Angebot annehmen oder ablehnen willst. Nimmst du das 
Angebot an erhalten sowohl du, als auch der Anbieter den Teil des Geldbetrags, wie er 
vom Anbieter aufgeteilt wurde.
Lehnst du das Angebot ab gehen sowohl du, als auch der Anbieter leer aus. 
Du wirst das Foto des jeweiligen Anbieters sehen, danach folgen deren Angebote. Nach 
jedem Angebot erscheinen am unteren Teil des Bildschirmes zwei Kästchen mit den 
Antwortmöglichkeiten „annehmen“ oder „ablehnen“. In welchem der beiden Kästchen die 
jeweilige Antwortmöglichkeit steht, variiert während dem Experiment. Solltest du jene 
Antwortmöglichkeit wählen die rechts am Bildschirm steht, drücke bitte die Taste 2 (am 
Ziffernblock). Solltest du jene Antwortmöglichkeit wählen die links am Bildschirm steht, 
drücke bitte die Taste 1 (am Ziffernblock). Nach dem Tastendruck siehst du das Foto des 
nächsten Anbieters und später sein Angebot usw.
Bezahlung: Die Summe des Gewinnes wird nach einem bestimmten Punkteschlüssel 
berechnet, der davon abhängig ist, wie du dich im Spiel entscheidest. 
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". sLORETA images of grand averages
sLORETA images of grand averages at FN latency showing standardized current density 
maxima for the six conditions. Coordinates, anatomical structures, and Brodmann areas are 
presented. Estimated cortical activation is shown from three perspectives (axial, sagittal, 
and coronal view), displayed with a scale exponent of 5.75. Activation maxima are coded 
in yellow and red. 
condition ANGRY-FAIR
condition ANGRY-MIDFAIR
67
condition ANGRY-UNFAIR
condition HAPPY-FAIR
condition HAPPY-MIDFAIR
68
condition HAPPY-UNFAIR
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Abstract in german
Bei der feedback negativity  handelt  es sich um eine negative Komponente des 
ereigniskorrelierten Potentials, die sensibel auf Feedback in Zusammenhang mit negativen 
Ereignissen oder monetären Verlusten reagiert. Da die feedback negativity zumeist mit 
Hilfe von experimentellen Paradigmen untersucht wurde, in denen die Folgen einer 
Handlung mit dem Verhalten der Versuchspersonen übereinstimmten, wurde davon 
ausgegangen, dass die feedback negativity einen Prozess der Verhaltensüberwachung bzw. 
des Lernens über kürzlich ausgeführte Handlungen widerspiegle.  
In verschiedenen Studien konnte jedoch mittlerweile nachgewiesen werden, dass die 
feedback negativity auch dann hervorgerufen werden kann, wenn Resultate nicht mit 
vorherigem Verhalten oder vorherigen Entscheidungen übereinstimmen. Diese Ergebnisse 
führten zu der Vermutung, dass die feedback negativity auch die Evaluation von 
Erwartungen bezüglich Umweltkontingenzen (zum Beispiel erwartete Zusammenhänge 
zwischen Belohnungen und Eigenschaften der Stimuli in den entsprechenden Studien) 
reflektieren könnte. 
Das Ziel der vorliegende Studie lag nun in der Überprüfung dieser Vermutung, indem 
versucht wurde die Erwartungen der Versuchspersonen, die die Rolle von Annehmern im 
Ultimatum Spiel übernahmen, bezüglich Zusammenhängen von Angeboten im Ultimatum 
Spiel und dem Gesichtsausdruck der jeweiligen Anbietern  aufzubauen und die feedback 
negativity zu evaluieren. Die Anbieter mit denen die Versuchspersonen konfrontiert 
wurden, zeigten, bevor sie den Versuchspersonen unterschiedlich faire Angebote 
unterbreiteten, entweder einen freundlichen oder einen verärgerten Gesichtsausdruck. 
Diese unterschiedlichen Mimiken sollten die Erwartungen der Versuchspersonen in Bezug 
auf die nachfolgenden Angebote beeinflussen.
Nach unfairen  Angeboten wurden im Vergleich zu den restlichen Angeboten größerer 
feedback negativity  Amplituden ausgelöst. Des Weiteren lösten freundliche Anbieter, die 
einen als unfair wahrgenommenen Geldbetrag offerierten, eine größere feedback negativity 
Amplitude aus, als verärgert aussehende Anbieter, die denselben Betrag anboten. 
Demzufolge scheinen Erwartungsverletzungen in Bezug auf Kontingenzen im Ultimatum 
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Spiel (freundliche Anbieter unterbreiten unfaire Angebote) zu vergrößerten feedback 
negativity Amplituden zu führen.
71
72
Curriculum vitae
Name: Schreiner
Vorname:  Thomas                                                   
Geburtsdatum: 11.07.1982
Geburtsort: Hallein bei Salzburg  
Zivilstand:            ledig
Wohnsitz:              Kaiserstrasse 93/10, 1070 Wien          
E - Mail:             thomasschreiner@gmx.at 
Telefon:  0650\8821107
Schulbildung
Volksschule Elixhausen                                 1988-1992  
Gymnasium der Herz- Jesu- Missionare       1992-2000                         
Zivildienst beim Mobilen Hilfsdienst in Sbg 2000-2001 
            
Berufsbildung
Studium der Psychologie an der Universität Wien ab 1.10.2001
Bisherige Anstellungen/Praktika:
Mobiler Hilfsdienst Salzburg     2001
Praktikum Salzburg AG                                 2003
Praktikum Personalabteilung Salzburg AG        2005                 
Praktikum Landesklinik für Psychiatrie 1           
Sonderauftrag für Psychosomatische Medizin
am St. Johanns – Spital     2006
Praktikum Universitätsklinik für Psychiatrie und
Psychotherapie - Klinische Psychodiagnostik (AKH) 2008
73
